G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR.,
NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though,
fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972,
while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen
years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity,
costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody
of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event
the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to
the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot
to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences
of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to
show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents
submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used
which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the
private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972,
Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an
unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the
principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of
Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners
contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and
that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by
Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was
the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties
in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article
reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a
jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle,
resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action flied
against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under
Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the
15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on
June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter
dictum (as it was not a party
to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be
held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in
general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply
only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at
the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued
the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared
in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school
was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede
those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the
other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30,
1960.
In Palisoc
vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was
killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical
Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding
in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily
liable with him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited
article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" — means
the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in
the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of
age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the
school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining
the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply
only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be
acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice
Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability
of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable
under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades
but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments
which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has
come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational
in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following
the canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not
to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as
concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long
as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil.
In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts
and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all
commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in someculpa
in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be
the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the
very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of
the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over
the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is
that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of
arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but
if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach
to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the
teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and
simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature
of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for
relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor
is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by
simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other
hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the
injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head
thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer
tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools
of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and
directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally
involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with
him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students
and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while
he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of
the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be
interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be
regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over
the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by
the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is
clear that while the custody requirement, to repeatPalisoc v. Brillantes,
does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it
does signify that the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with
the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period
of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of
the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or
has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the
discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its
rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term
papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still
subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically the
same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their
custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical
control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any
time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed
by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even
of the head thereof under the general principle ofrespondeat superior,
but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of abonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken
the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher
will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law
for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in
the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense,
Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by
Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not
the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as
principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations
for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact,
these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security
force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms
should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori,
the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to
hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as
they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this
respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure
of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is
not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the
child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and
sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides being
coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline
on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability
than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there
should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities
less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for
the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer
under the former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in
assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived
at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still
in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment
or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was
there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring
of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over
the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge,
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that
it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining
that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action
or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it
does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been
shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none
of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending
student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with
such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the
record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and
dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given
the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as
"teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to occasions where
there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem
to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever
stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and
obligations as parents whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily
held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter
remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who
stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute
parental authority:
Art. 349 The following persons
shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade
establishments, with regard to apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations
between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not
contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school,including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since
Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the
same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties
as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed.,
p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the
Civil Code, supra, it is
apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated the classification of
"teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from
"directors of trade establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and
crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need
for a major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh
paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a situation long
gone and out of date. In a Palisoc
v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548)
situation, it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in
schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and
universities are no different from students in liberal arts or professional
schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher—student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps
early high school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their
late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or reactionary
group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most unfair to hold teachers
liable on a presumption juris
tantum of negligence for acts
of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to
prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the
acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt
them as they would other members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers
and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The
provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its
purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its
imperfections. However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended
or repealed.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and
dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given
the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as
"teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to occasions where
there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem
to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever
stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and
obligations as parents whenever in such a standing. Those persons are
mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as
the latter remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory
custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who
stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute
parental authority:
Art. 349 The following persons
shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade
establishments, with regard to apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations
between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not
contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school,including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since
Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the
same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties
as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed.,
p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the
Civil Code, supra, it is
apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated the classification of
"teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from
"directors of trade establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and
crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need
for a major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh
paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a situation long
gone and out of date. In a Palisoc
v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548)
situation, it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in
schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and
universities are no different from students in liberal arts or professional
schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher—student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps
early high school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their
late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or reactionary
group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most unfair to hold teachers
liable on a presumption juris
tantum of negligence for acts
of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to
prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the
acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt
them as they would other members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on
quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar
as grown up students are concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make law.
It can only apply the law with its imperfections. However, the Court can
suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Alfredo
Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein
petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics
teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the
students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants
completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since
the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and
trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal
gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody
because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held
liable.
HELD:
The
time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the
school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish
his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal
and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In
the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held
liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a
student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear
negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with
the shooting incident.
Collegio
San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because
only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed,
none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo
resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
FACTS:
17 year old Alfredo Amadora was shot
and killed by his classmate Pablito Daffon inside the school campus. Daffon was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The parents filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de
San Jose Recoletos, its high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaints
against the students was later dropped. Upon appeal to CA, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school should be held liable for the acts of its
students.
RULING:
The responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends. Under the Article 2180 of the Family Code, it is the teacher-in charge
is the one who is imposed on the liability of his/her students and not the
school. As long as defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Art. 2180.
Walang komento:
Mag-post ng isang Komento