G.R.
No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA
RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,
vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.
vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.
D.
Ignacio Castillo for petitioners.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
BAUTISTA
ANGELO, J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing
one Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to
petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24, 1939,
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to satisfy
the payment of an obligation.
The
facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo,
Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos,
executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the
latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a
parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue
of the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one
Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore said property. Together with another
parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on
its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to
foreclosure the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners,
brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was
served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf
and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance
for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial,
at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with
interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August
9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay
the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final.
The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the
judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the
court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which
were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff
issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed
by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the
properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed
in possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the
petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain
why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with
the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ
partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five
years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale
conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly
served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation
given by petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted
in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court
if they failed to obey the order. Hence this petition for certiorari.
The
issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision
rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668,
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the
properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated
September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place
respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in
possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee.
As
regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a
collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has
become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its
face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought
principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil.,
717).
Granting
for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with summons
in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when
the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their
attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in their behalf in all stages
of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners must be
presumed to have been authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in
all the stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings
require that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should
be received with undue favor to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien,
55 Phil., 53). This is specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only
after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment has been
rendered that petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The
second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple reason
that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not
an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules
of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court can
undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of
limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the meantime
(Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct
interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final
executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has
transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their
possession. In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the
litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why
the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in
the possession of the property.
The
general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure
suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the
latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The power
of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession, is said
to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees and thus
avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad,
71 Phil., 340).
It
has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party
thereto intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real property
mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the
litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section
3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) provides that the confirmation of the sale by
judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their
respective rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it
is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may be
placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public
auction sale and become his by virtue of the final decree confirming the
sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). Emphasis
supplied.
The
following American authorities may also be involved in support of the order of
the lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action
for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the premises, RETAINS
its jurisdiction and has authority to put the purchaser in possession of the
property, without compelling him to resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc.,
1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle
that the court which has exclusive authority to foreclosure the equity of
redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it,
and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to put the
purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to the suit, and who
is bound by the decree. When the court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, and
has investigated and decided upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends
of justice merely to declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was
to be understood that after a decree and sale mortgaged premises, the
mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps, those who have been let into
possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could withhold the
possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and compel the purchaser
to resort to a court of law, I apprehend that the delay and expense and
inconvenience of such a course of proceeding would greatly impair the value and
diminish the results of sales under a decree. (See Notes to Wilson v. Polk,
51 Am. D., 151). (Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore,
the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
Paras,
C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate
Opinions
PABLO, M., concurrente:
El
16 de junio de 1948, el Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Pangasinan
ordeno a los recurrentes que compareciesen el 8 de julio del mismo año, alas 8:30
a.m., para explicar sus rzaones porque no deben ser castigados por desacato por
rehusar cumplir la orden de ejecucion expedida en la causa civil No. 7668 el 5
de enero de 1948. Los recurrentes presentaron una mocion de reconsideracion que
fue denegada. Y acuden ante este Tribunal en un recurso de certiorari. La
solitud debe denegarse, pues contra cualquiera resolucion sobre el incidente de
desacato pueden los recurrentes presentar apelacion. El articulo 1 de la Regla
67 dispone que "Cuando un juzgado, junta, o funcionario investido de
facultades judiciales, hubiere actuado sin jurisdiccion o se hubierse excedido
de su competencia o con grave abuso de ella, y, en la tramitacion ordinaria del
caso, no existiere el recurso de apelacion ni ninguno otro que fuese llano,
expedito y adecuado, toda presona por ello agraviada podra presentar solicitud
bajo juramento ant e el Tribunal correspondiente alegando con certeza los
hechos del caso y pidiendo se dicte sentencia que anule o modifique, con
arrespidiendo se dicte sentencia que anule o modifigue, con arreglo a derecho,
lo actuado por dicho Tribunal, junta o funcionario, con las costas." Esta
disposicion esta interpretada en varias ocasiones:
Solamente procede el remedio de certiorari cuando
un tribunal, en el ejercicio de sus funciones judiciales, haya actuado sin
jurisdiccion o con exceso de ella o con grave abuso de discrecion y que, en la
tramitacion ordinaria, no tiene el recurrente el remedio sencillo y expedito de
apelacion. (Regla No. 67, articulo 1). Si por cada error cometido por un
juzgado inferior se permitiese corregirlo por medio del recurso de certiorari,los
asuntos serian intrminables. (Regala contra El Juez del
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan, 44 O.G., 30).
No. se expedira mandamiento de certiorari a
menos que resulte de una manera clara que el Juez contra el
cual se dirige procedio sin jurisdiccion o se excedio en ella o abuso
gravemente en el ejercicio de su discreccion; no se expedira para subsanar
errores de procedimiento o enmendar conclusiones de hecho o de derecho
erroneas. Si el Juez tiene jurisdiccion sobre la materia litigiosa y sobre las
partes, todo cuando decida sobre las custiones pertinentes a la cause son
resoluciones que estan dentro de su jurisdiccion y por irregulares o reeneas
que sean no pueden corregirse mediante certiorari. (Ong
Sit contra Piccio y otros, 44 O.G. 4915.)
De si el Juzgado inferior erro al dictar ordenes, el error
debe suscitarse en una apelacion y no en un recurso de certiorari. Solamente
se recurre a este remedio cuenda no cabe apelacion. Demaisip y otra
contra Makalintal y otros, 47 O.G., Supp. (1) 153.)
Tenian
los recurrentes, en el curso ordinario de los procedimientos, un remedio para
corregir cualquier error que pudiera haber cometido el Juzgado.
Por
estas razones, es improcedente el recurso de certiorari.
TUASON, J., concurring and
dissenting:
I
am in complete agreement with the majority decision on the two propositions
formulated in the opening paragraph, namely; (1) that the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged property was in accordance with law, and
(2) that placing Felipa Lopez in Possession of the said property was a natural
corollary of the first. But the appealed order also threatens the petitioners
with punishment for contempt if they refuse to vacate the lands. This, to me
the most important feature of the order, has been ignored or brushed aside in
the decision. By its sweeping denial of the petition, this Court sanctions the
impending punishment. To this extent, I dissent.
In
the case of U.S. vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil., 183, the Court said:
A writ of execution to sheriff directing him to place a
plaintiff in possession of property held by a defendant and failure or refusal
on the part of the defendant to surrender the property does not constitute
contempt or disobedience to an agent of authority as defined in art. 252, P.C.
It is the duty of the sheriff to place the proper party in possession. Whether
a refusal to deliver the property to the sheriff on demand would constitute
contempt, quaere.
x x x
x x x x x x
A person can not be punished because of his alleged
disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution
issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff directing the latter to place
the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order
addressed to the defendant. Such an order must been addressed to an officer of
the court and not to either the plaintiff or the defendant. The party in
possession may have been unwilling to deliver the land, but such unwillingness
does not constitute an act of disobedience to order of an agent of authorities,
as defined by art. 252, P.C. The disobedience contemplated by said article
consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct judicial order and not an
order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties. In the case at
bar, while the order does direct that the party in possession shall surrender
the property to the proper person, it does not and could not order his to do so
to do. Instead of executing the judgment himself, the sheriff merely ordered
the defendant to deliver the property. A sheriff has no power to require any
person to perform an act which he himself is bound to perform. Under such
circumstances, disobedience on the part of the person to whom the sheriff gave
such an order does not constitute a crime.
Act
3170, subsequently passed, added a new paragraph to Section 232 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, reading as follows:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished as for contempt:
x x x
x x x x x x
5. The person defeated in civil action concerning the
ownership or possession of real estate who, after having been evicted by the
sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with the judgment
rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb
possession by the person whom the sheriff placed in possession of said realty.
But
the new enactment has not given courts a new power to punish the recalcitrant
loser for contempt before he is evicted. It is only when he reenters or
attempts to reenter after he is punishment. In the case at bar, the purchaser
of the mortgaged property has never been placed in possession thereof by the
sheriff, much less have the present occupants been evicted therefrom.
The
validity of the lower court's order that is the subject of the present
proceeding is not attacked on the ground of lack of authority of the court to
punish for contempt for their refusal to quit lands; but this Court's decision
in keeping silent on this vital point could or would, be construed as a green
light signal for the respondent Judge to proceed with the enforcement of his
said order with all it's intended ramifications.
I
do not believe that the petitioners' action is punishable as for contempt on
another ground. Although they were included as parties defendants in the
foreclosure suit, yet the dispositive part of the judgment imposes no duty on
them either to pay the mortgaged debt or to make delivery of the mortgaged
property. As was said in U.S. vs.Ramayrat, supra,
"the disobedience contemplated by Art. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure
consist in the failure or refusal to obey a direct judicial order and not an
order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties."
CASE
DIGEST
FACTS:
1.
RAMOS family executed power of attorney in favor of their
brother Eladio Ramos:
1.
Gave Eladio authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in
favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
i. Executed a mortgage under Rivera.
Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300,
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum.
ii. Eladio Ramos failed to pay the
obligation on its date of maturity
1. RIVERA filed an action to foreclosure
the mortgage, making RAMOS defendants.
2. Summons served only upon Eladio Ramos,
who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney
Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and
submitted an answer in their behalf.
3. Court ordered Eladio Ramos to pay to
the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12
per cent per annum, from
August 9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees,
and ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to
pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes
final.
iii. ELADIO RAMOS failed to pay the
judgment within the period.
1. Court ordered the sale at public
auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold RIVERA (highest bidder)
iv. RIVERA sold properties to Felipa
Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession.
v. RAMOS did not heed the order.
1. Summoned by the court to explain why
they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the
writ of possession.
2. RAMOS answered contending that said writ
partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five
years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale
conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly
served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit.
a. EXPLANATION UNSATISFACTORY.
b. Follow or contempt of court.
ISSUE:
WON decision of lower court ordering foreclosure of mortgage
excluded by ELADIO RAMOS is valid.YES.
WON order directing issuance of writ of possession to place
LOPEZ in possession of properties purchased by her from mortgagee valid. YES.
HELD:
PETITION DISMISSED with costs against the petitioners.
1.
1st ISSUE:
1.
CLAIM CANNOT BE SUSTAINED.
2.
Nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on its face
is valid and regular and has become final long ago.
i. Valid judgment can only be attached in
separate action brought principally for the purpose.
ii. Granting that RAMOS were not served,
defect in service was cured when RAMOS voluntarily appeared and answered the
complaint thru their attorney of record.
iii. Since Attorney Maiquez appeared for
RAMOS, it must be presumed him to have been authorized by them.
2.
2nd ISSUE:
1.
Issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceeding
is not an execution of judgment but a ministerial and complementary duty of the
cour.
2.
Can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided
the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened.
i. SEC 6, RULE 39/ SEC 3, RULE 70:
Judgment is already final, properties mortgaged sold by order of the court,
purchaser thereof has transferred them to a 3rd person, who desires to be
placed in their possession.
ii. GENERAL RULE: After a sale has been
made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, court has the power to give possession
to the purchaser.
1. Purchaser will not be driven to an
action at law to obtain possession.
2. Power of the court to issue a process
and place the purchaser in possession, rests upon the ground that it has power
to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious
litigation.
iii. In a foreclosure suit, 3rd person not a party intervening and
debtor continues in possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of
possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the litigation.
1. “Duty of the competent court to
issue a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the
property which he purchased at the public auction sale and become his by virtue
of the final decree confirming the sale.”
Walang komento:
Mag-post ng isang Komento