[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October
14, 2003]
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO
H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a
case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from their posts --
conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own
behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However,
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to
administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda
Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Cabatuan and Maasin,Iloilo. In
the Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting
to grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.[2]
On September
7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a
prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and
damages[3] covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant
was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case. Thus,
Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated
respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent
required the defendants in the civil case to show cause why the preliminary
injunction should not be granted. Respondent
judge scheduled the hearing on September
21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation[5] on September
17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file
an answer. After the September 21
hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September
28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the defendants filed their
Opposition[7] to complainants prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO. The September
28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the
authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her
co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the defendants ten
days[9] to file a motion to disqualify
complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her
opposition thereto.
In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the
defendants Motion[11] to disqualify complainant from
appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three
Motions[12] praying for judgment to be rendered on
the civil case. In an Order[13] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied
complainants Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a
restraining order and an injunction. He
likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension of time to file an answer.[14] Complainant did not ask for a
reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends
that complainant filed a Petition for his inhibition after filing two
administrative cases against him. He
argues that the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is not a
ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the exercise of their discretion,
however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent
later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the
resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that he was
mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented
before him.[16] Besides, complainant allegedly failed
to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for
preliminary injunction.[17] Moreover, she supposedly failed to
exhaust the remedies available to her to question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to
render a decision on the case.[18]
Respondent likewise refutes complainants
assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not
afford the services of a lawyer. Such
claim was allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as
clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.[19] He further alleges that she did not
secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to
file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court.[20]
Evaluation and Recommendation of the
Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the
issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the Complaint should first
be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal action.
However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been
decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for
preliminary injunction and the principal action for forcible entry remained
unresolved even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil
Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that
respondent judge be fined in the amount of P1,000
with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt
with more severely.[21]
It did not, however, find complainant
completely faultless. It
therefore undertook another round of investigation, the subject of which was
complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself and on behalf of her
co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and
employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to government service to
ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are not absolutely prohibited
from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior
approval of this Court. The OCA
added that [e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which
amounts to malfeasance in office.[22]
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel
without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be
directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had
appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and
recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be
restored as promptly as possible.[24]Designed as
special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to
disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary actions.[25] Accordingly, technicalities or details
of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.[26] The actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. Both are time
procedures designed to bring immediate relief.[27]
Moreover, as correctly observed by the
OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain
from doing a particular act or acts.[28] It may also require the performance of
a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted prior to
the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that the
prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case
of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear
command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec.
15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A
possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the
filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainerfor
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court
shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
(Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey.
In fact, the provision uses the word shall to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of
respondent that since there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until after he
shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then the main case
would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a
prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action
for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main
case. This is the very reason why
the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry
case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions andTROs are
extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed
party from further damage during the pendency of
the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has
impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and judiciously, cases and
other matters pending before their courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith
and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt
disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof.[31] Judges are thus enjoined to decide
cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. Often
have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the required period
is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[32] To avoid sanction, they should ask
this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in
asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use this
excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided
within the prescribed period. This
Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this
case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed
since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for
preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to
meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in
full control of the proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of the
whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters convenience that should
be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice.[34]
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose
of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost
diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and
duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:[35]
We
cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the
clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership
has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket
congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and
duties.[36]
The prompt disposition of cases becomes
even more pronounced when a municipal trial court is called upon to decide a
case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug,
speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:[37]
x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the
first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any other colleague on
the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public
perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that
influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the
courts.[38]
We have often held that failure to decide
cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against erring judges. Given
the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000
is appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40]
As to Complainant Maderada,
the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of P1,000 for supposedly engaging
in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator
held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her
co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in
office.
Since complainant was charged with
engaging in a private vocation or profession when she appeared on her own
behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of
law. We clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law. Section
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC.
34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a
litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from
its commencement to its termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded.[42] Individuals have long been permitted
to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not
considered to be in the practice of law.[43] One does not practice law by acting
for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to
himself.[44]
The practice of law, though impossible to
define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and ascounsel by
rendering legal advise to others.[45] Private practice has been defined by
this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts
or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice]
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself,
complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public
as a lawyer. Neither was she
demanding payment for such services.Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring
to the members of such a vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is defined as a persons regular
calling or business; ones occupation or profession.[48]
The law allows persons who are not lawyers
by profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate
her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary
does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a
right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a
discussion of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod[49] regarding the extent of the practice
of law.
However, it was also clearly established
that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below,
for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.Representing oneself
is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent
themselves in court will not apply when a person is already appearing for
another party. Obviously, because
she was already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for
her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely protecting
her rights. That their rights may
be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she
and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the
efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without permission
from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would
undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we
consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she
appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a
fee. Again we should be reminded
that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of
justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.[50] Given these circumstances, the penalty
of reprimand[51] is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to
tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short of the
exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus,
it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its
employees in order not to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it
will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless
accusation that trifles with judicial processes,[52] and that serves only to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice.[53]
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge
Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to
observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely. On the other
hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is
herebyREPRIMANDED for
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is
likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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