GUERRERO V CA GR L-44570

FACTS:

1.     1969 | Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated in Aurora, Quezon.

2.     Plaintiff was allowed to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed.

3.     he was made to do some other similar chores even in the copra processing

4.     For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

5.     1973 | plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts.

6.     He felt aggrieved and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacanang, Manila.

Office of the Pres: let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

7.     July 1973 | he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom.

8.     Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. & demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived,

9.     Benitez filed this case for reinstatement with damages.

CA: tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez

The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents, thus:

ISSUE: W/N a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one another

HELD: YES

1.     Guerrero insists that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as an employee from the landholding and not ousted therefrom as tenant. BUT BASED ON LAW:

"agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)

"share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

1.     The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.

2.     Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was ejected from it.

a.     Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who, has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. Respondent Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's copra kiln.

b.     A hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry.

The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer and they have an agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners.

Their agreement also proved that benitez signed as a tenant, but the petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer farm employee but since their relationship is guided by RA1199, their rela should be construed as landowner-tenant rel not an ER-EE rel.

Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:

ATTY. NALUNDASAN

Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the right to live in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.

The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199),

the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (Republic Act 3844),

the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and

Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants.

Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:

l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;

2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;

3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the agreement of the parties;

4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:

5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;

6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).

None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

HIDALGO V HIDALGO GR L-25326

HIDALGO V HIDALGO 

FACTS:

1.     Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was the owner of the subject parcels of land located in Batangas. (22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter)

2.     R sold the subject parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00.

3.     petitioners-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants thereof seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00

4.     R did not give 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code

5.     The deeds of sale were registered by RD and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code. ² 

6.     The actions for redemption were timely filled on March 26, 1965 by petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale, prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.

ISSUE: W/N P, as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land where no notice intention to sell the property was previously given to them by the vendor, and where the vendor did not execute the required affidavit before the registration of the deed of sale.

W/N right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to share tenants

HELD: YES

'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.'

The right of redemption granted by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else.

1.     The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy

a.     Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public policy" and decrees its abolition.

b.     It was error for the agrarian court to state that "the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy."

c.     share tenancy contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever of the following events occurs earlier:

(a)   the end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or

(b) the shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or

(c) the share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.

In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy contracts — which is going to be the transition to leasehold system —the same section 4 declared---- the tenant shall continue in possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code."

2.     The agrarian court was mistaken to assume that right of redemption/pre-emption is available to leasehold tenants only and excludes share tenants because the Code grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to nobody else." It did not use the word tenant but “lessee” But they were once considered all share tenants.

3.     But in sec 11, agricultural lessor is used interchangeably with landowner.

4.     Application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute is in order since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

Section 11 provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition," presumably for being beyond their capabilities.

7.     Clearly then, the Code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally will change from share to leasehold, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants,

In the case, however, the deed of sale executed by R in favor of respondents-vendees for the price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while what is sought to be redeemed is only 22,876 square meters,

Code precisely provides that the farmer shall have "the preferential right to buy the (landholding) under reasonable terms and conditions" or "redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration" ²¹ 

Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did not rule upon conflicting claims of the parties as to what was the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the stated price of P4,000.00 — whether P1,500.00 as claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the proportionate values of the two other parcels, but the whole total is not to exceed the stated price of P4,000.00, since the vendor is bound thereby — and likewise, what was the additional proportionate worth of the expenses assumed by the vendees, assuming that petitioners are not willing to assume the same obligation, the case should be remanded to the agrarian court solely for the purpose of determining the reasonable price and consideration to be paid by petitioners for redeeming the landholding, in accordance with these observations.

In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra, assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are entitled to redeem the landholding for the same stated price.

ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted.

In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations hereinabove made.

HEIRS OF TAN V POLLESCAS GR145568

HEIRS OF TAN V POLLESCAS

The Antecedents

FACTS:

1.   Petitioners Norma Tan, Jeanette Tan, Julieta Tan, Rommel^[3] Tan and Enrique Tan, Jr. (Tan Heirs) are co-owners of a coconut farmland (Land) located at Labo, Ozamis City with an area of 25,780 square meters.^[4]

2.   Esteban Pollescas (Esteban) was the original tenant of the Land.

3.   Upon Estebans death in 1991, his son Enrique Pollescas (Enrique) succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique Tan (Tan).^[5]

4.   However, respondent Reynalda Pollescas (Reynalda), Estebans surviving second spouse, demanded that Tan recognize her as Estebans successor.

5.   Tan did not accede.

6.   Thus, Reynalda filed with DARAB-Ozamis a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and damages.^[6]

DARAB:     1. declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the Land.    

2. apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the customary sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.^[7]

7.   Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests.

8.   The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such amount.^[8] However, Reynalda ignored the demand.

9.   Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against Reynalda

MTC: Reynalda guilty of estafa^[10]

10.                Reynalda continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the DARAB an ejectment case.^[12]

DARAB Misamis: ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs.

Reynalda Pollescas is ordered to vacate

11.                Reynalda appealed to DARAB-Diliman

DARAB-Diliman: reversed the decision of the DARAB-Misamis ordering

the landowners to respect the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding.

Reynalda is ordered to pay her unpaid leasehold rentals.

CA: AFFIRMED

Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando,---mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholders share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay x x x.

The Court of Appeals held that Reynaldas failure to deliver the full amount of the Tan Heirs share could not be considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive the Tan Heirs of their share.

The Court of Appeals held that Reynalda honestly believed that she was entitled to a share of the harvests in 1992-1993

The Court of Appeals further declared that the rental must be legal to consider non-payment of such as a ground for ejectment. The appellate court stated that:

Any excess in payment of rental shall be considered illegal.

Section 34 of RA 3844 provides that the consideration for the lease of riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent of twenty-five per centum of the average normal harvest.

The tenant is obliged to pay a maximum of 25% of the normal harvest and not two thirds as in the case at bar.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), nothing in the law that makes failure to deliver share a ground for extinguishment of leasehold agreement.^[18] Reynaldas failure to deliver fully the share of the Tan Heirs is not sufficient to disturb the agricultural leasehold relation.^[19]

The Issues

W/N REYNALDA IS OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET PLACED UNDER THE LEASEHOLD SYSTEM PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657.^[20]

W/N REYNALDA SHULD BE DISPOSSESSED OF THE LANDHOLDING DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF RENT

  

The Ruling of the Court

On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code^[21] abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.^[22] 

No ground for dispossession of landholding

Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relationship, the landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law.^[27] 

RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural leasehold tenants right to security of tenure.^[28]

Section 36 of RA 3844 | Grounds for Dispossession:

Dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: 

Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: 

Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.

APPLICATION:  

In the instant case, the Tan Heirs seek Reynaldas ejectment from the Land on the ground of non-payment of lease rental

The Court agrees with the CA that for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful.

If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.

Section 34 of RA 3844 mandates that not more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold.

 In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by law.

 Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.

Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.

Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended.^[30] 

Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental.^[31]

No ground for extinguishment of leasehold relation

The Court also holds that there is no ground for the extinguishment of leasehold relation in this case.

Only in the instances stated in Sections 8 and 28 of RA 3844 as amended can leasehold relation be terminated.

SEC. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:

(1)               Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;

(2)               Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or

(3)               Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.

SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year.The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for any of the following causes:

(1)               Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;

(2)               Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contract with the agricultural lessee;

(3)               Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no compensation is paid;

            (4)               Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household; or

(5)               Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the assailed Decision dated 31 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48823. The Court REMANDS this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the determination of the provisional lease rental. Costs against petitioners.