De Roma v CA SCRA 152 SCRA 205

FACTS:

1.     Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma.

2.     She died intestate and administration proceedings were instituted in CFI Laguna by FELICIDAD CARINGAL as guardian of Rosalinda.

3.     Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate.

4.     This was opposed by Rosalinda (ung Kapatid) on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.¹

5.     what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation.

6.     FELICIDAD CARINGAL argues that it is subject to collation in conformity with Article 1061.

7.     Buhay, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so 

expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

RTC: ruled in favor of the P.

1.     When the decedent made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.

2.     The donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.³

CA: REVERSED | deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. ⁵

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.⁶ 

The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made.

It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1a

The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.

Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is 

whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,⁷ the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

VDA DE TUPAS V RTC 144 SCRA 622

FACTS:

1.     Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir.

2.     He also left a will with assets pertaining to lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre.

3.     However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc

4.     Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her.

RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds

(1) Article 900 is not applicable because the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978;

(2) the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and

(3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 106 1, C.C. ²


ISSUE: W/N a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow.


HELD: YES.

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). ³ 
If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess,  though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable -------its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate.

This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-established rule in 


Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., ⁴ where this Court said:

... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal, computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor's estate.

Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious or not. ⁵

Even if the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death does not prevent it from being collated.


COLLATION applies to gifts inter vivos. ⁶ The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.


Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law ⁷ chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious,


These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined to find out whether it is inofficious or not

(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death;

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;

(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir. ⁸

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured.
 If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess.

In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the production of evidence in the Court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.