Sabado, Pebrero 6, 2016

Nunez v. Ibay, AM No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009

D E C I S I O N



PERALTA, J.:


Before this Court is a Sinumpaang Salaysay[1] dated April 22, 2005 filed by complainant Valeriano F. Nuez with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging the latter with grave abuse of authority.

Complainant alleged the following in his complaint:

Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005, at around five oclock in the afternoon, he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L-300 van with plate number SFN-767, at the basement of the Makati City Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles home. After the flag ceremony on April 4, 2005, complainant went to the Office of the Engineering Department where he received an Order[2] from respondent Judge, directing the former to appear before the latter on that same day at ten oclock in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for respondent Judge.

When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer. Although complainant replied in the negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the complainant. Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judges space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent Judge.

However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainants apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt of court for using the formers parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).[3] Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in FortBonifacio, where the latter was incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration[4] and paying the fine of P1,000.00.

In his Comment[5] dated June 27, 2005, respondent Judge alleged that judges were assigned their respective parking spaces in the basement of the City Hall of Makati City. Respondent Judge, in particular, placed a marker with his name at the space allotted to him, facilitating the orderly parking which allowed him to work as early as seven oclock in the morning, almost daily. He stated that he already programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking judge for the year 2004 among the RTC judges of Makati City.

Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time in question, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

In addition, respondent Judge recounted that there were similar incidents which happened to him. Sometime in August 2002, Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales, and Redeem Ongtinco caused an overflow of water into the chambers of respondent Judge, damaging his computer system at the old RTC. On March 18, 2005, Venancio P. Inonog, security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Section of Makati City, also parked his vehicle at respondents parking slot. On April 12, 2005, John Panaligan, electrician of the MakatiCity Hall, erroneously switched off the electrical outlets of respondent Judges sala.

Respondent Judge cited Macrohon, Gonzales, Ongtinco, Inonog, and Panaligan in contempt on the ground that they disrupted respondent Judges performance of official duties. In turn, Macrohon et al., Inonog, and Panaligan all filed their respective administrative complaints[6] against respondent Judge.

On November 25, 2005, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative matter, and that respondent Judge be fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for grave abuse of authority.[7]

In its Resolution[8] dated March 15, 2006, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate Justice Renato Dacudao of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. On June 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice issued an Order setting the said case for hearing.

The Investigating Justice submitted a Partial Report on September 6, 2006 in which he stated that he had just finished receiving the evidence for the parties and required them to submit their respective memorandum. He also asked for an extension of two months from September 20, 2006, or until November 20, 2006, within which to submit his Final Investigation, Report and Recommendation.

In his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice concluded:


Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned Investigating Justice believes that the complainant was not the person who parked the van on respondent judges parking slot, but rather that it was Oscar de los Reyes. Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L-300 van in the middle, and not on the side, which was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although the witness, Oscar de los Reyes testified that, after buying merienda (on April 2, 2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to explain where exactly he parked the van. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have parked the van at the same place, meaning the basement parking, but not necessarily on the very same spot or slot.

But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van, it would not change or alter the fact that respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot. Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who parked the van he would not have asked complainant to explain, but instead De los Reyes. x x x In addition, why still subject complainant to further humiliation by having him handcuffed, like a common criminal, after citing him for contempt of court? Obviously, respondent judge was really bent on citing for contempt of court the person responsible for doing the parking in the parking slot which he believed, (perhaps erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondent judges character, as it would seem that he could not refrain from exhibiting such excesses as causing the manacling (apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional offender like the complainant herein, who had the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as a judge.

x x x x

In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why complainants act of parking on the parking slot of respondent judge would constitute contempt of court. It may have caused respondent judge some delay in immediately parking his car that morning of April 4, 2005, but to say that the one-hour disruption delayed the administration of justice would be stretching the logic of the situation too much. According to respondent judge, time is of the essence in his decision-making program. But the irony of it is that the amount of time respondent judge allotted in hearing the explanation as well as the motion for reconsideration of complainant in this case must have cost him more than the one hour he claimed he lost.

As justification for his actions, respondent judge said that because of the prior or previous incidents he was convinced that the particular incident was intentional and deliberate. Such reasoning is unacceptable. There was no showing that complainant or Oscar de los Reyes intentionally or deliberately parked the van on respondent judges slot in order to purposely annoy or irk him. And, even if it did annoy or irk respondent judge, he should remember that, the power to cite persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are strictly impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the official functions that they exercise or perform.

Besides, it was unfair for respondent judge to assume that complainant knew of the prior or previous incident, where respondent judge cited a driver for contempt of court for parking on his parking slot, just because both drivers are employees of the Makati City Hall; this is clearly a non-sequitur. And, assuming that complainant knew of the said incident, this alone would not prove that what he did was intentional or deliberate.

Neither would respondent judges allegation, that someone, an unknown person inside, is orchestrating the filing of these cases against him for the chief or sole purpose of harassing him, exonerate him of the charge. To begin with, he failed to present any proof to substantiate this allegation. All he could point to are mere coincidences or speculations. What is more, respondent judge seemed to have taken some kind of pleasurable satisfaction in citing these complainants in contempt of court simply for parking on the slot which he assumed was allot(t)ed to him; or for switching the lights off in his office; or for accidentally drenching his computers. He, in fact, even admitted having issued all these Orders to punish the complainants in these cases for disrupting or disturbing him in performing his duties; hence, he cannot blame these persons for filing a case or cases against him, as these persons must have felt aggrieved by his actuations in precipitately citing them for contempt. Nor can he accuse an unknown person of orchestrating all of these. All the cases or incidents he mentioned only strengthened the undersigned Investigating Justices perception that respondent judge has an unseemly propensity for abusing the power granted to him by law.

Respondent judge ought to be reminded that as a member of the bench, he is expected to take recourse to the contempt power only as a last resort, when all other alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect for the court and its processes; and that when a less harsh remedy can be availed of by the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy.

Thus, if respondent judge wanted to teach complainant a lesson, he could have done so by merely reprimanding or admonishing him considering that when complainant appeared before respondent judge he immediately begged for forgiveness.

Respondent judges act of citing complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot is a violation of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

x x x x

For the reasons heretofore stated, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure aggravated in this case by a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondents character, as elsewhere indicated.




RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the finding of guilt of the respondent judge, the undersigned Investigating Justice deems that certain circumstances must be considered in imposing the proper penalty.

It must be noted that respondent judge has a very good performance record. His strong adherence to the Supreme Courts reminder that, members of the judicial branch judges and judicial personnel alike to be conscientious, diligent and thorough in the performance of their functions. At all time(s) they must observe the high standard of public service required of them. is quite admirable and commendable. Also, he already admitted his error in declaring complainant in contempt of court. All these may be taken as mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his culpability.

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the undersigned Investigating Justice hereby recommends that the respondent Judge be fined in the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (Php5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2007, the Court referred the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation, within thirty (30) days from notice, on the propriety of consolidating the instant case with the other administrative cases filed against respondent Judge.

In its Memorandum dated March 30, 2007, the OCA observed that:


After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office agrees with the Investigating Justices findings that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in citing complainant in contempt of court. Respondent wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the van on respondents assigned slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondents reaction to the complainants mistake is exaggerated. The complainants act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it could not delay the administration of justice.

There is no evidence to show that complainant Nuez parked the van at respondents slot purposely to annoy him or he was aware of the previous similar incident which involved Venancio Inonog. In fact, complainant explained that his mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondents forgiveness. Respondent likewise failed to substantiate his allegation that someone is orchestrating the filing of administrative cases against him for the sole purpose of harassing him. The other complainants cannot be faulted for filing the said cases as they may have felt aggrieved by respondents actuations in citing them for contempt for flimsy and personal reasons.

x x x x

Respondents order dated April 4, 2005 citing complainant Nuez in contempt of court betrays not only his ignorance as regards the Rule on Contempt of Court, but it also shows his despotic nature. The fact that respondent had also declared Inonog, Panaligan, Macrohon and two others in contempt of court shows that he does not possess the judicial temperament which a judge should possess. x x x

The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and its proceedings. In the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner and for purposes that are purely personal.

The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to respondents offense. This is not respondents first offense. He had been administratively sanctioned for grave abuse of authority and was ordered by the Court to pay a fine on June 21, 2006 in the case of Panaligan v. Ibay docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972. In the case filed by Allan Macrohon, et al., docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970, respondent was ordered by the Court to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority and was also warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent has another pending case filed by Venancio Inonog for the same charge. In the said case of Allan Macrohon, et al. against respondent, the Court stated that the similarity of the charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a deplorable proclivity for the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation.

Taking into consideration that the instant complaint is a third transgression of a similar offense, this Office recommends that respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay be SUSPENDED for FOUR (4) MONTHS with STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar act shall be dealt with more severely.


In its Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted within 30 days from notice.

In its Resolution dated November 21, 2007, the Court deemed as served upon the complainant the copy of the Resolution dated July 25, 2007 which was sent to complainant, but was returned unserved with postmans notation RTS-Unknown.
In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, after failure of respondent Judge to manifest whether he was willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted as required in the Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court deemed the case for decision.

The issue which lies before this Court is whether respondent Judge can be held administratively liable for grave abuse of authority in citing complainant for contempt of court.

The power to hold a person in direct contempt is provided for under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be a lower court.


In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,[9] the Court held that the power to declare a person in contempt of court, however plenary as it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties.

Respondent Judge averred that someone was out to harass and embarrass him, which was why six different complaints were simultaneously filed against him, prompting him to cite the complainants for contempt of court. He explained that the individual acts of the complainants were contemptuous, including herein complainants improper parking, because they disrupted the speedy administration of justice.

The Court disagrees. Aside from the fact that respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see how the improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest manner, disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the aforementioned acts for which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the records, nor from the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake.

In Oclarit v. Paderanga,[10] the Court held that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindicative, principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise.

By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, cited as follows:
SEC.2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.


Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.[11] In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[12] state that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.


The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. Gross has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.[13] Under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is classified as a serious offense punishable under the sanctions enumerated under the same Rule, Section 11 of which provides that:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1.                  Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In previous cases wherein judges cited persons for contempt without legal basis, the Court has found respondents guilty of grave abuse of authority and usually imposed a penalty of reprimand with a warning, or a fine of P5,000.00 with a warning.[14]

However, respondent Judge has been twice administratively sanctioned by the Court for the same offense. In Panaligan v. Ibay,[15] respondent Judge was found to have abused his authority in citing a person for contempt without sufficient legal basis, for which he was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Macrohon v. Ibay,[16] he was again found liable for the same offense and sentenced to pay a fine of P25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

In view of respondent Judges penchant for citing persons for contempt even without legal basis, the Investigating Justice recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning, while the OCA recommended that he be suspended for four (4) months with a stern warning. Considering that respondent Judge had opted to avail himself of the Optional Retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1438, effective at the close of office hours of August 18, 2007, which was approved by the Court (First Division) per Resolution dated November 14, 2007,[17] provided that the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos shall be retained/withheld from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may later impose upon him in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (herein case) and OCA IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ, the Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P40,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuez for contempt without legal basis, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits, which in this case shall be deductible from the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) withheld from his retirement benefits, per Resolution dated November 14, 2007.
SO ORDERED.






















CASE DIGEST
FACTS


The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Valeriano F. Nuñez, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked a government vehicle which he was driving at the parking space reserved for respondent judge.

Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judge's space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent Judge. However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainant's apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt of court for using the former's parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).[3] Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration[4] and paying the fine of P1,000.00.

In his Comment, Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time of incident, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

RULING:

YES.


The Supreme Court held that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.

By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under the law. Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.

 In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary state that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. "Gross" has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while "misconduct" means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.

Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuñez for contempt without legal basis, and was ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).





Montecillo v. Gica, GR L-36800, October 21, 1974

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition forcertiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarilythe high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review oncertiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.

Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.

The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.

The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.

It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.



Manangan v CFI, GR 82760, August 30, 1990

G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the contrary was true, and that the AliasWarrant of Arrest was irregularly issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982,Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried, let alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands, Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands, who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused from filing a Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter's death, assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused had died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is declared to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
- Petitioner counsel for himself was charged in CFI with violation of RPC (Execution of Deeds by Intimidation). On the same date an order of arrest was released.
- He then filed a petition for CPM with TRO assailing the jurisdiction of the lower court. However the same was dismissed for non-payment of legal fees. 
- During prelim invest. he did not show up and disappeared for 1 year.
- When he surfaced an alias writ was issued. And he challenged this Alias Writ. He contested the Alias writ in CFI but the latter said that the said warrant of arrest was still in force after the lapsed of time.


SC: Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.

Outline Week 3


I.              Appearance of non-lawyers

- Law student practice rule (Rule 138-A)
§ 1 Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997
- Non-lawyers in courts
§ Sec. 34, Rule 138 (Pro se)
· 2 Maderada v. Mediodea, AM MTJ-02-1459, October 14, 2003
§ Sec. 7, Rule 116
§ Sec.33, Rule 138
- Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals
§ Art. 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 442
§ 3 Five J. Taxi v. NLRC, GR 111474, August 22, 1994
§ Cadastral Act No. 2259, Section 9
- Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
§ Sec. 17, Rules of Procedure for Small Claim Cases
§ Sec. 415, RA 7160 (Local Government Code)
- Sanctions for unauthorized practice of law
§ 4 Vargas and Panes, Jr. v. Atty. Ignes, et.al., AC 8096, July 5, 2010
§ 5 Manangan v CFI, GR 82760, August 30, 1990
§ 6 Montecillo v. Gica, GR L-36800, October 21, 1974
§ 7 Nunez v. Ibay, AM No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009
§ 8 People v. Godoy, GR. 115908-09, March 29, 1995
§ 9 Tan v. Balajadia, GR 169517, March 14, 2006

II.             Public officials and the practice of law

- Public officials who cannot practice law or are with restrictions
Prohibition
§ Sec. 35, Rule 148
§             
10 People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
§ Sec. 15, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
§ Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution
§ Sec. 8, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
§ Sec. 90, RA 7160

                11 Oca v. Atty. Ladaga, AM No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001

Restrictions
§ Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

                                12 Ramos v. Manalac, GR L-2610, June 16, 1951
                                13 In re David, Adm Case No. 98, July 13, 1953

§ Sec. 91, RA 7610
§ Sec. 1, RA 910

                                14 Noriega v. Sison, GR L-24548, October 27, 1983
                                15 Catu v. Rellosa, AC 5738, February 19, 2008

- Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys
§ Rule 6.03 of CPR
§ Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019
§ Sec. 7(b) of RA 6713