Sabado, Pebrero 6, 2016

Vargas and Panes, Jr. v. Atty. Ignes, et.al., AC 8096, July 5, 2010

RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335[1] passed on July 17, 2008 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case filed by the complainants against the respondents.

The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006.[2] The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes.[3] However, controversy later erupted when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Pea board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.

On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea board filed Civil Case No. 1793[4] for Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the present Board of Directors, the Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted Resolution No. 009[5] appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.

Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of Court[6] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages[7] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. On March 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint[8] in Civil Case No. 1799.

Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079[9] dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007.

In its letter[10] dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gombas insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Igness services and requested to hire another counsel.

Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint[11] against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in their position paper[12] that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Igness contract in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion[13] in Civil Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.

In his defense,[14] Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contracts pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in deference to the OGCCs stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Manns defense.[15]

On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation[16] before the IBP with the following attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.

In his report and recommendation,[17] the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.

As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that they be fined P5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per Santayana v. Alampay.[18] The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case because respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al. in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for being filed by one not duly authorized by law; and that the authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks the conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable for willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.

In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from private funds of the members of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.

After a careful study of the case and the parties submissions, we find respondents administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,[19] issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,[20] we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.

In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes presently stand as KWD legal counsels, there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Naduas engagement as legal counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.

Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in Phividecs behalf considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.[21] Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.

In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.

Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic notes[22] in Civil Case No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept any motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of appeal[23] dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC, in its Order[24] dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.

As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?

The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling in Phividec.[25] Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the rule requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as counsels of KWD which question was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWDs counsels[26] dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23, 2007[27] respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.

With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as counsels of the members of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel in their private suits.

Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired.[28] In Santayana,[29]we imposed a fine of P5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.

Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on each respondent.

On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1799.[30] As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified by the Court of Appeals.[31] We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.




Maderada v. Mediodea, AM MTJ-02-1459, October 14, 2003

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin,Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.[2]
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages[3] covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation[5] on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition[7] to complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the defendants ten days[9] to file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants Motion[11] to disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions[12] praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order[13] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainants Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension of time to file an answer.[14] Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before him.[16] Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction.[17] Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case.[18]
Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.[19] He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court.[20]
Evaluation and Recommendation of the
Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round of investigation, the subject of which was complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that [e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.[22]
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature, because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly as possible.[24]Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary actions.[25] Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.[26] The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. Both are time procedures designed to bring immediate relief.[27]
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts.[28] It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainerfor the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word shall to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions andTROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage during the pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof.[31] Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[32] To avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters convenience that should be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice.[34]
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:[35]
We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties.[36]
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:[37]
x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.[38]
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40]
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.[42] Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.[43] One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.[44]
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and ascounsel by rendering legal advise to others.[45] Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services.Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to the members of such a vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is defined as a persons regular calling or business; ones occupation or profession.[48]
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod[49] regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.[50] Given these circumstances, the penalty of reprimand[51] is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes,[52] and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[53]
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is herebyREPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.


BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.


Five J. Taxi v. NLRC, GR 111474, August 22, 1994

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON,respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
-          Private Respondent Maldigan and Sabsalon was hired by the Petitioner Company as taxi drivers. The contract was composed of a 24-hour shifting sched on 4 days. They had to make a boundary from 450 (non aircon) and 700 (aircon), adding to that are car washing expense and deposit for any deficiency in the boundary
-          Petitioner learned Maldigan has been working for another taxi company, while Sabsalon was held up by armed passengers.
-          Sabsalon went back to work but failed to report on several occasions, even leaving his taxi, and failing to remit his boundary mark
-          Respondents requested for the reimbursements of their respective deposits, but petitioner refused because of the repairs incurred by their vehicles.
-          Respondent now files complaint for illegal dismissal and deduction
Issue:
-          W/N deductions were illegal.
Held:
-          Yes, the deposits made were illegal
-          Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.