Probable Cause

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Lim v Felix 194 SCRA 292

FACTS:

1.    1989 | at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.

2.    During the preliminary investigation, the designated investigator of the PC Criminal Investigation Service filed an amended complaint with the MTC Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate  Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

MTC: a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla aliasTidoy.

3.    Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.

4.    The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.

5.    Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante."

MR – DENIED

6.    Fiscal Alfane filed with the RTC-Masbate, (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.

7.    Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue.---approved (from RTC Masbate to RTC Makati---raffled to Judge Felix) to avoid a miscarriage of justice

8.    Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court an order requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause and to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail

RTC denied the motions due to lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE: W/N a Judge may issue a search warrant without personal examination of the facts and relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists. NO

HELD: NO

ACCDG. TO LAW: The issuance of a warrant is an exercise of judicial discretion. [Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.]

Warrant of arrest, when issued. Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause

The Judge in order to personally satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest.

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:

We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.

He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

People v Inting 187 SCRA 788

FACTS:

1.    February 6, 1988 | Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of with the (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

2.    COMELEC, acting on the complaint, directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City:

a.    (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case;

b.    (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court;

c.     (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and

d.    (4) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.

3.    After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.

RTC: issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

4.    But before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

5.    The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter."

6.    Atty. Lituanas failed to secure the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. RTC quashed the information.

7.    MR - DENIED

ISSUE: W/N A preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the RTC may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?


HELD: NO


[ART 9C SEC2] In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.

This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office.

Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

DIFF BET. PROBABLE CAUSE determined by a Judge and Public Prosecutor

ART 3 SEC 2 PROVIDES: “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge ... "

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.

It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.


The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge (JUDICIAL IN NATURE). The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor (EXECUTIVE IN NATURE).

De Roma v CA SCRA 152 SCRA 205

FACTS:

1.     Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma.

2.     She died intestate and administration proceedings were instituted in CFI Laguna by FELICIDAD CARINGAL as guardian of Rosalinda.

3.     Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate.

4.     This was opposed by Rosalinda (ung Kapatid) on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.¹

5.     what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation.

6.     FELICIDAD CARINGAL argues that it is subject to collation in conformity with Article 1061.

7.     Buhay, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so 

expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

RTC: ruled in favor of the P.

1.     When the decedent made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.

2.     The donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.³

CA: REVERSED | deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. ⁵

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.⁶ 

The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made.

It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1a

The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.

Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is 

whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,⁷ the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

VDA DE TUPAS V RTC 144 SCRA 622

FACTS:

1.     Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir.

2.     He also left a will with assets pertaining to lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre.

3.     However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc

4.     Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her.

RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds

(1) Article 900 is not applicable because the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978;

(2) the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and

(3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 106 1, C.C. ²


ISSUE: W/N a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow.


HELD: YES.

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). ³ 
If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess,  though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable -------its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate.

This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-established rule in 


Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., ⁴ where this Court said:

... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal, computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor's estate.

Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious or not. ⁵

Even if the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death does not prevent it from being collated.


COLLATION applies to gifts inter vivos. ⁶ The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.


Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law ⁷ chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious,


These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined to find out whether it is inofficious or not

(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death;

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;

(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir. ⁸

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured.
 If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess.

In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the production of evidence in the Court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.

GUERRERO V CA GR L-44570

FACTS:

1.     1969 | Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated in Aurora, Quezon.

2.     Plaintiff was allowed to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed.

3.     he was made to do some other similar chores even in the copra processing

4.     For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

5.     1973 | plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts.

6.     He felt aggrieved and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacanang, Manila.

Office of the Pres: let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

7.     July 1973 | he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom.

8.     Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. & demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived,

9.     Benitez filed this case for reinstatement with damages.

CA: tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez

The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents, thus:

ISSUE: W/N a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one another

HELD: YES

1.     Guerrero insists that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as an employee from the landholding and not ousted therefrom as tenant. BUT BASED ON LAW:

"agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)

"share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

1.     The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.

2.     Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was ejected from it.

a.     Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who, has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. Respondent Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's copra kiln.

b.     A hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry.

The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer and they have an agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners.

Their agreement also proved that benitez signed as a tenant, but the petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer farm employee but since their relationship is guided by RA1199, their rela should be construed as landowner-tenant rel not an ER-EE rel.

Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:

ATTY. NALUNDASAN

Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the right to live in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.

The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199),

the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (Republic Act 3844),

the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and

Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants.

Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:

l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;

2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;

3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the agreement of the parties;

4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:

5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;

6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).

None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.